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4.1  Introduction 
Our aim in this chapter is to present evidence on two issues: the relative 
contributions to inflation in each of these countries of domestic and of 
international  factors, and the relative importance of the channels through 
which the international factors have operated. 
The difficulty that arises in investigating these issues is that most, if not 
all, of  the foreign countries we consider seem to have been neither fully 
open nor fully closed. Exchange rates in a number of  notable instances 
during the Bretton Woods era underwent substantial changes; the var- 
ious domestic monetary authorities often seemed to pursue policies dif- 
ferent from those of the world at large, and the propensity of  government 
of some of these countries to tinker with markets for international goods 
and capital ran high. Nevertheless, all seven foreign countries experi- 
enced the same general pattern of  inflation  as the United  States, the 
reserve-currency country, for close to half the sample period. 
One solution to the problem would be to estimate more general models 
that relax some of the simplifying assumptions of the polar-case open- 
and closed-economy  models.'  Darby and Stockman in  chapter 5  and 
Gandolfi and Lothian in chapter 14 adopt that approach. Our approach, 
in contrast, is to conduct a series of tests of  Granger-causality for each 
country  for a number of  relations,  some between  domestic variables 
alone, others between domestic and foreign variables. 
Anthony Cassese is a financial economist and portfolio strategist at Citibank, N.A 
An earlier version of  this chapter appeared in the Journal of  Monetary Economics 10 
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examples of  earlier work in  this area. 
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The merit in this approach is that it avoids the problem of  the structure 
of  the model limiting the range of  investigation.  Indeed, the tests we 
apply are intended to provide evidence that will permit us to rule out 
some previous model-identifying restrictions. It therefore not only serves 
as a convenient point of  departure for constructing and estimating more 
general models but provides a way of reevaluating some of  the models 
that have been already estimated. The drawback, of course, is that the 
simple bivariate relations underlying our tests may themselves give rise to 
specification bias caused by the omission of  other important variables. 
4.2  Theoretical Consideration 
To derive a set of testable hypotheses about the international transmis- 
sion  of  inflation  based  on timing  relations among variables,  we  first 
review the model underlying the simple monetary approach to the bal- 
ance of  payments  (MABP).’ We present  expressions for the rates of 
inflation and of  monetary growth in a small open economy and point out 
the model’s implications for both. In so doing, we point out what we 
believe is a popular misconception surrounding the MABP: the view that, 
in the context of  the most basic model, changes in monetary growth will 
follow rather than precede changes in inflati~n.~  We then relax some of 
the simplifying assumptions of the model and state the timing implica- 
tions of  these modifications for questions of  international transmission. 
4.2.1  The Monetary Approach 
The simplest expositions of  the MABP start with a money demand 
function of  the standard form, a purchasing power parity relation, and a 
money market equilibrium condition.  Ignoring interest  rates, we can 
write the first as 
(4.1) 
where M  is the nominal stock of  domestic money, P the domestic price 
level, yp  permanent income, and k the income elasticity of  demand. The 
purchasing power parity or, if  the exchange rate is assumed perfectly 
rigid, price arbitrage relation is simply 
log (MIP)?  = k log ypr, 
(4.2)  P* = TP;, 
where P’ is the rest-of-world price level and T  the (constant) exchange 
2.  Johnson (1976) is the classic statement of  the monetary approach. 
3.  Swoboda (1977), in discussing the monetary approach to the transmission ofinflation, 
states that the monetary approach may be distinguished from others in that “causation for a 
small open economy runs from income to the stock of  money” (p. 15). For a contrasting 
view, see Branson (1977). 60  Chapter Four 
rate. The equilibrium  condition relates  the nominal  stock of  money 
supplied to the nominal stock demanded, 
(4.3)  M, = Mf. 
Taking logarithms of (4.2) and (4.3), differencing the results along with 
equation (4. l),  and making the appropriate substitutions, we arrive at the 
standard expressions for the domestic rate of  inflation  .. 
(4.4)  P( = P; 
and monetary growth 
(4.5) 
where a dot over a variable indicates a logarithmic first difference. 
Equations (4.4) and (4.5) are equilibrium relations that describe the 
long-run growth paths of  domestic money and domestic prices. This is 
readily  apparent from the assumption of  instantaneous  adjustment of 
money demand to supply. In much of  the literature, however,  these 
dynamic relations are thought to do more: to have implications also for 
the time path of  the adjustment to equilibrium. As the authors of  one 
recent study using the simple MABP model have put it, “there is a clear 
presumption  to [the] existence  and direction”  of  the leads  and  lags 
between domestic money, prices, and nominal income in a small open 
economy  under  a  fixed  exchange-rate  regime  (Putnam and  Wilford 
1978). 
4.2.2 
What the authors of the statement seem to have in mind is something 
like the following. Consider a position of dynamic equilibrium in which 
the reserve-currency country’s money stock and prices and the domestic 
money stock and prices are growing at constant rates, for simplicity all 
assumed to be equal. Now let monetary growth in the reserve-currency 
country increase.  Its rate of  inflation will  eventually follow suit. The 
increase in inflation will, via arbitrage, be transmitted as an instantaneous 
and equal increase in inflation in non-reserve-currency countries. The 
new rate of inflation, in turn, will mean that domestic real cash balances 
are now growing more slowly than desired. The rate of  hoarding,  the 
inflow of foreign reserves, will increase as a result. Therefore, after the 
fact, so will the rate of  growth of the domestic money supply. 
The problem is, however, that this sequence of events does not follow 
directly from the model presented above. In the model everything takes 
place within a single period. For the reserve inflow to follow the equaliza- 
tion of inflation rates, the growth rates of the actual and desired nominal 
stocks of  money would have to differ. That can be effected within the 
model fairly simply, but it requires replacing equation (4.3) with some 
form of  stock adjustment relation like 
M,  = P:  + kipr, 
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(4.6a)  log M, -  log Mr-l= P(l0g Mf- log M[-l), 
or, equivalently, 
(4.6b)  log M,= P(l0g Mf)  + (1 -  p) log A4-1. 
Using (4. l),  substituting successively for the lagged actual stock of  money 
and differencing the result, we would then arrive at a new equation in 
which the current period's monetary growth would be a distributed lag, 
with geometrically declining weights of  inflation in the reserve-currency 
country and of  growth in permanent income: 
(4.7) 
r 
M,  = p ,z  (1 -  p)i(kjPrpi  + i;-i). 
r=O 
Extending the model in this way also seems reasonable from an empir- 
ical standpoint since most  demand-for-money studies have uncovered 
lags of several quarters or more in the adjustment process linking actual 
and desired money balances. To derive alternative testable hypotheses 
about the international transmission mechanism, one might also want to 
relax some of the other strong assumptions of the simple MABP model. 
Three  possible modifications of the simple model are to relax the assump- 
tions of  instantaneous price arbitrage, equilibrium in the money market 
of  the reserve-currency country, and full employment. Later we consider 
the implications of  permitting short-run sterilization policies. 
First, let us consider the question of price arbitrage.  Here the empirical 
evidence to date is  inconsistent  with  convergence  of  overall  rates of 
inflation within a quarter and perhaps even within a period of  several 
years.'  One reason often given is the existence of  sizable nontradable 
goods sectors. In this instance, even if prices of  tradable goods adjust 
quickly, prices of nontradable goods may adjust only with a substantial 
lag. If that is the case, then the domesticinflation equation, (4.4), and the 
domestic  money  growth  equation, (4.5)  or (4.7), would  have  to be 
rewritten to take account of  the differences in speeds of  adjustment of 
prices between tradable and nontradable goods across countries.s The 
end result is that the timing relation between domestic monetary growth 
and overall inflation becomes less easy to determine. Given a sufficiently 
slow adjustment of prices of nontradable goods, domestic inflation might 
not be observed to lead domestic monetary growth. 
The next logical step would be to relax the implicit assumption that 
prices in the reserve-currency country adjust fully and instantaneously to 
monetary changes. For example, consider the monetary transmission 
mechanism Friedman and Schwartz (1963~)  outline for a closed econ- 
4. Kravis and Lipsey (1978), among others, present evidence counter to the arbitrage 
5.  See BIejer (1977) for a model in which the slower adjustment of  prices of  nontradable 
hypothesis. 
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omy. The key element in their view is the series of portfolio adjustments 
that an unanticipated change in monetary growth engenders.h 
To  illustrate, suppose monetary growth in a closed economy suddenly 
increases. Initially, market yields on financial assets and equities, and 
then a whole host of implicit yields on consumer goods of every degree of 
durability, temporarily fall as money holders desire to rid themselves of 
excess cash balances and as the adjustment proceeds from one sector to 
another. Spending in all of  these areas therefore increases, and output 
and prices begin to rise more rapidly. Eventually stock equilibrium  is 
reestablished; holdings of  real cash balances are lower, and inflation is 
higher than before the increase in money growth. 
Suppose we now open that model to the international realm. Consider, 
for  instance,  what  happens to the small country in  a world of  fixed 
exchange rates when monetary growth in the reserve-currency country 
undergoes  an unanticipated  increase.’  Initially,  this  excess  supply of 
money in the reserve-currency country reflects itself in an excess demand 
for  alternative  assets  denominated in  both  the reserve currency and 
foreign currencies. The prices of those assets rise, and their yields fall. 
The fall in interest rates produces an excess demand for money in the 
small country which, in  part, is  satisfied  by  the inflow of  reserves as 
residents of the reserve-currency country reduce their excess holdings of 
money  and then  increase  their  expenditures  on bonds  and  equities. 
Eventually  the process  spreads to the markets  for  consumption  and 
investment goods in both the reserve- and non-reserve-currency coun- 
tries.  As  expenditures  on these goods increase,  their  prices  and the 
overall price levels in both countries begin to rise more rapidly. At the 
same time,  interest  rates on bonds and on equities begin  to rise  and 
approach their initial levels. 
The final equilibrium position is one in which monetary growth, infla- 
tion, and the nominal interest rate on bonds, both in the reserve- and 
non-reserve-currency  countries, are all  higher;  holdings  of  real  cash 
balances are lower; and international payments positions are altered. The 
reserve-currency country now has a greater balance-of-payments deficit, 
and foreign  countries  have  greater balance-of-payments surpluses or 
smaller deficits. If  the asset approach is a reasonable expression of the 
adjustment mechanism, then we have a further reason to suppose that 
domestic monetary  changes in  a small open  economy would  not  lag 
price-level  changes. 
6. If  the monetary change were fully anticipated, the price-level  response would be 
immediate. The information set used to form anticipations therefore has a crucial bearing 
on the exact timing relation. 
7. The papers by Frenkel and Rodriguez (1975) and by Girton and Henderson (1976) 
describe models of  this general sort. In both, however, the authors confine their analysis to 
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We could  also relax  the implicit  assumption in  the MABP of  full 
employment; then the transmission mechanism operating through port- 
folio adjustment provides a further rationale for small-country monetary 
growth actually leading its rate of  inflation. For example, suppose an 
unanticipated increase in monetary growth in the reserve-currency coun- 
try induced the portfolio adjustments described above. This would be 
followed by increased expenditures by residents of the reserve-currency 
country on foreign goods, which would lead to a balance-of-payments 
surplus and expansion of  aggregate demand and output in  the small 
economy. At the same time, the accumulation of  reserves by the small 
economy’s central bank would lead to an expansion of its high-powered 
money and overall money supply. Initially the bulk of the increase in the 
nominal income of  the small economy would be reflected in output. Only 
after some time had elapsed would the effect be manifest upon the price 
level alone. 
In conclusion, the lead or lag of money over prices, in what appears to 
be an open economy,  is  an uncertain  guide to settling  questions of 
causation and more importantly the international transmission of infla- 
tion. We would view a lead of prices over money and to a lesser extent a 
coincidence in movements as prima facie evidence of the importance of 
foreign influences. But a lag of  prices behind money is consistent with 
either domestic or foreign monetary forces being the causative factor. 
4.2.3 
Fortunately these modifications of the simple model have other empir- 
ical implications that can help us differentiate among alternative hypoth- 
eses about the international  inflation process. One testable hypothesis, of 
course, is derived from the presumed operation of price arbitrage. For a 
small open economy, if  arbitrage  were not  instantaneous, we would 
expect prices in the rest of the world to lead domestic prices. 
Similarly, if  assets markets provide another linkage among countries 
we would expect there to be a relation among interest rates in one country 
and those in the rest of the world during periods of fixed exchange rates. 
Again, assuming that the effects are not instantaneously felt, we would 
expect changes in interest rates in the rest of the world, or in the reserve- 
currency country, to precede those in a small open economy. 
Analyzing the timing relations between high-powered money and its 
counterparts on the asset  side of  the central  bank’s  balance  sheet- 
foreign reserves and domestic assets (domestic credit)-and  between 
those two asset components themselves can also help to  clear up some of 
the ambiguities that surround the timing relation between money and 
prices.  Let us  consider  three cases:  the  reserve-currency  country, a 
completely open small economy, and an intermediate case. 
In the reserve-currency country, the U.S.,  the increase in monetary 
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expansion underlying an increase in its inflation and ultimately that of the 
rest of  the world is the result of credit expansion by the reserve-currency 
country’s central bank. Accordingly, its domestic assets will be positively 
related to, and either lead or be coincident with, its high-powered money. 
Indeed, the foreign component of  the reserve-currency country’s high- 
powered money is of  minor importance for that country. Changes in. its 
balance of payments will be a result rather than a cause of  variations in 
the growth of  the reserve-currency country’s high-powered money. High- 
powered money therefore will be negatively related, and either lead or be 
coincident with, the balance of payments of a reserve-currency country. 
In a completely open small economy, movements in its domestic assets 
are unimportant as an effective source of monetary change. An overex- 
pansion of  domestic assets of the central bank ultimately will be nullified 
by  reserve  outflows,  underexpansion  by  reserve  inflows.  Changes in 
foreign reserve holdings of  the central bank  are the channel through 
which monetary expansion occurs. Therefore foreign reserves will bear a 
positive  and  either  coincident  or  leading  relation  to  high-powered 
money. Changes in domestic assets will be unrelated to high-powered 
money  growth  but  bear a  negative  and  either coincident  or leading 
relation to foreign reserve changes for a non-reserve-currency  country. 
The intermediate case  is  the most  difficult  to handle.  Changes in 
domestic assets and foreign reserves are both potential sources of mone- 
tary changes. Some sterilization of  balance-of-payments movements is 
likely, and at the same time some feedback of domestic credit expansion 
on foreign reserves flows will be observed. We would expect therefore to 
see changes in  both foreign reserves  and  domestic assets  to bear  a 
leading, or perhaps coincident, positive relation to high-powered money 
growth and a negative  and bidirectional  relation to each other. Both 
foreign  reserves  and  domestic  asset  movements  can  influence  high- 
powered money growth in the intermediate case. 
4.3  Testing Timing Relations 
In this section we describe the technique we use to test timing relations. 
We define such relations as relations that exhibit a temporal precedence 
of  one or more variables over another. In this paper we concentrate on 
bivariate timing relations. We believe these tests are useful for discrimi- 
nating between relations which are postulated to be fundamentally differ- 
ent in various versions of the monetary model of  transmission discussed 
in the previous section. 
To examine timing relations, we use the incremental prediction crite- 
rion introduced by Granger (1969) and developed further by Sims (1977). 
Granger defines a causal relation, e.g. between X  and Y,  on the basis of 
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of one stochastic process, say X,, for the description of the joint stochastic 
process, {Y,, Xs}.  This is usually stated as: series X  (Granger) causes 
series Y if  we can better predict Y by utilizing past values of  Y and X than 
by using merely past Y alone. The criterion Granger suggests for making 
this  assessment is  a comparison  of  conditional mean  squared errors 
contingent upon the information sets inclusive and exclusive of series X. 
Thus, if  X  helps to predict Y,  in the sense of  reducing the mean squared 
prediction error for Y,  then X  Granger-causes Y. 
Sims proves two theorems on (stationary) stochastic processes which 
are relevant in this context. Sims’s analysis begins by recognizing that the 
stationary processes Y and X  can be represented as 
(4  * 8)  Y,  = A(L)u,  + B(L)E,, 
(4.9)  x,  = C(L)u,  + D(L)€,, 
where u, and E,  are uncorrelated stationary processes and A(L),  B(L), 
C(L),  and D(L)  are polynomials in the lag operator L. According to 
Sims’s first theorem, a necessary and sufficient condition for Y not caus- 
ing X  is that either C(L)  or D(L)  be identically zero. For example, Y 
would not cause X  if, and only if, equation (4.9) could be written as 
(4.10)  X,  = D(L)E,  . 
His second theorem states that the failure of  Y to Granger-cause X is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for treating X  as strictly econometri- 
cally exogenous with respect to Y. 
The import of  these two theorems is that once we establish the exist- 
ence of  a particular representation  between  two variables (or, more 
accurately, once we establish that we cannot refute the existence of  one) 
we have good reason to treat one variable as exogenous. Of course, one 
variable, which may be exogenous with respect to another variable in the 
framework of  a bivariate system, may be endogenous with respect to a 
third variable. Nevertheless, the treatment of certain variables as exoge- 
nous lends structure to our economic models. The implied structure 
permits us to choose a better model from among classes of models each of 
which has a structure with a particular set of  exogenous variables. 
To conduct the causality tests, we ran regressions of the general form8 
m  n 
r=l  j=1  Y,  =  a0 + .c p,Y,-,  + c rjx,-j + u,,  (4.11) 
as well as the corollary regressions in which we constrained the rj to be 
identically zero, 
m 
i= 1  y,= (Yo + z p,Y,-i  + u,.  (4.12) 
8. Sargent (1976) contains a discussion of  this form of  the test. 66  Chapter Four 
By comparing the improvement in the explanation of Y obtained from 
(4.11) with that derived from the companion regression (4.12), we can 
determine whether series X  contains information useful in explaining 
series Y.  Then, by reversing the roles of X and Y in regressions (4.11) and 
(4.12), we can establish whether an empirical representation of Y and X 
implies that one of  the series is exogenous. Thus, if we can demonstrate 
within reasonable  statistical limits that the following representation  is 
plausible, 
(4.13) 
rn  n 
and 
m  ... 
X,  = a*  + 2  d&i, 
i= 1 
(4.14) 
then, according to Sims’s theorems, Y does not cause X or, alternatively, 
X  is exogenous. 
This is the regression test suggested by Granger;  our interpretation of  it 
is, however, somewhat looser than the conventional one. For the most 
part, we eschew using the word “cause” and instead speak in terms of 
timing. The reason, which should be clear from the theoretical presenta- 
tion in section 4.2, is that in at least one  of the areas  in which we deal-the 
money-price relations-leads  and lags are a poor guide to the question of 
causation in economies that have an unknown degree of  openness. In 
terms of the debate over “measurement versus theory” that has recently 
been rekindled  (see Sims 1977) our approach can perhaps best be de- 
scribed as “measurement with some theory.” 
A related point about methodology that bears mentioning is the poten- 
tial  bias  inherent in  this  type  of  testing  procedure. Commonality of 
movements in the series being analyzed may be captured in the autore- 
gressive terms; this is implicitly disregarded by the method we use. As 
several others have pointed  out (e.g. Zellner 1977), this can  lead to 
accepting the null  hypothesis of  no relations between  the two series 
when, in fact, one actually exists. In defense of the methodology, we 
should point out that this bias can also be a blessing. The simple fact of the 
matter is that in most industrial contries inflation and monetary growth 
over our sample period rose dramatically and at much the same time. 
Analyzing innovations in the time series may be the only way to separate 
the influence of one factor from another. 
In  almost  all  instances, we  transform  the data for  the purpose of 
rendering the series stationary. In general, we use natural logs of  the 
levels to reduce the problem of  heteroscedasticity. We then difference 
the log levels, usually once but in some experiments twice. This proce- 
dure is intended to eliminate the trend in the mean of  a series which is 
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the advantage of  simply and symmetrically “prefiltering” the data with- 
out the substantial time costs and lost degrees of  freedom one typically 
incurs when applying Box-Jenkins techniques. Moreover, it is not subject 
to the criticism that too much has been removed since nearly all aggregate 
economic time series regression analysis must consider the transforma- 
tion we apply in order to come to terms with the estimation-efficiency 
question. The one exception to the general transformation procedure was 
the (net) domestic asset versus (net) foreign asset relations for certain of 
the countries for which the net positions took on a negative value. In 
these exceptional instances, we used arithmetic values of the levels and 
arithmetic first differences scaled by high-powered money. 
4.4  Empirical Results 
Our discussion of empirical results is divided into several parts: domes- 
tic money and prices, price and interest-rate arbitrage, asset components 
of high-powered money, and sources of monetary change. In our analy- 
sis, we cover periods beginning in 195811  and experiment with a variety of 
lag structures. 
4.4.1  Domestic Money and Prices 
We summarize the money-price results in tables 4.1 and 4.2. There we 
report the F statistics for the Granger tests of the relations between three 
monetary aggregates, high-powered money, M1 and M2, and two mea- 
sures of prices, the GNP or GDP  deflator (table 4.1) and the consumer or 
other similar retail price index (table 4.2), for the eight countries in our 
 ample.^ 
Except for France and Italy, a significant effect of  lagged money on 
prices exists for at least one domestic monetary aggregate and both price 
variables for all three periods. In the case of France, the only significant 
effects for all periods were for high-powered money growth on consumer 
price inflation. In the case of  Italy, the significance of  the money-price 
relation varies among the combinations of monetary and price variables 
from period to period.  In  most  countries, however, we  find  a more 
pervasive influence than appears in either the French or Italian case; the 
majority of the relations prove significant for both definitions of the price 
level. 
The reverse influence (prices on money) is considerably less visible. A 
significant effect of  prices on money without feedback only appears in 
Italy and the U.K. in two instances, each with high-powered money, and 
in France in two instances with M2. Significant bidirectional influences 
appear in relatively few instances. Moreover, only in the case of the U.K. 
9. The data we use were compiled from individual country  sources by the NBER Project 
on the International Transmission of  Inflation. Table 4.1  Money and Price Deflator 
rn 
y=ac,+ x  p<yr-,+ z  y,  x,-, 
,=I  ,=  1 
F Statistics for Lags (m. n)  and Period Ending:' 
1971111  1973IV  1976IV 
Variable.' 
m=6  m=8  m=6  m=8  m=6  m=8 
Country  Y  X  n=3  n=8  n=3  n=8  n=3  n=8 






























































































































































































































































































0.9330 Table 4.1 (continued) 
F Statistics for Lags (m,  n)  and Period Ending:$ 
197  1111  1973IV  1976IV 
Variable ' 
m=6  m=8  m=6  m=8  m=6  m=8 
Country  Y  X  n=3  n=8  n=3  n=8  n=3  n=8 
UK  PD  H  1.1017  0.9244  1.3687  1.0933  0.2929  1.9991% 
PD  MI  3.5272*  3.6844"  4.2292"'  4.1970"  2.1 304 *  3.9948" 
PD  M2  3.3290'  4.0148'#  3.4599'  4.8635 '*  1.0124  2.3725* 
H  PD  5.9046'#  2.3159##  4.282  1  #'  2.8633"  0.6952  1.4133 
M1  PD  0.4415  1.2775  1  S263  1.6117  2.8020'  2.0691# 
M2  PD  0.2520  1.6050  2.2744'  4.1369##  3.3308'  1.4786 
us  PD  H  3.0960'  1.2327  1.1244  0.8451  2.1612$  0.7881 
PD  M1  7.1747  '#  3.21  15  ##  3.9259'  2.3341  #  3.6139'  2.6592#* 
PD  M2  5.0927"  2.0143?  2.2580*  1.81631  2.5727  *  2.6491 ** 
H  PD  1.9995  2.1232'  2.4702  2.5302'  1.6230  3.6927'# 
M1  PD  0,6292  0.3813  0.7209  0.8829  1.0213  0.4108 
M2  PD  0.5870  0.2438  1.3583  0.6631  0.4676  0.5512 
'All variables are first differences of  the natural log; PD is the GNP or GDP deflator, H is high-powered  money, M1 is currency plus demand deposits, and 
M2 is currency plus the sum of  demand and time deposits. 
"All  regressions start in 195811. The null hypothesis is that the y,  are as a group equal to zero. 
$Reject null hypothesis at Q = 0.10. 
#Reject null hypothesis at Q = 0.05. 
#*Reject null  hypothesis at a = 0.01. Table 4.2  Money and Consumer Price Index 
m  " 
y=a"+  H p,Yr-,+  x v,  Xr-, 
,=I  ,=  1 
F Statistics for Lags (m, n)  and Period Ending:4 
1971111  1973IV  1976IV 
Variablet 
m=6  m=8  m=6  m=8  m=6  m=8 
Country  Y  X  n=3  n=8  n=3  n=8  n=3  n=8 
CA  PC  H  1.7304  2.0398  2.8630'  3.4068"  2.4287'  3.3497'" 
PC  M1  0.9011  1.3335  2.3543'  2.6750'  0.9549  1.8960* 
PC  M2  1.8998  2.3211#  2.1980*  2.4818'  1.7972  1.7089* 
H  PC  0.4004  0.9647  0.7010  0.7435  1.8513  1.0520 
M1  PC  0.7429  1.2814  0.6568  0.7356  1.1255  0.9205 
M2  PC  1.9417  1.2898  4.0227"  2.0999'  3.1621'  1.6265 
FR  PC  H  3.0838'  1.6784  5.9429''  2.1667'  2.1861'  1.1267 
PC  M1  0.9035  0.4313  0.8488  0.9236  0.9707  0.7959 
PC  M2  0.9320  0.8640  1.  SO80  0.6122  1.2368  0.5168 
H  PC  1.0301  1.1479  0.6391  0.8123  1.1896  0.9482 
M1  PC  0.1366  0.7419  0.0794  0.8701  0.0667  1.0880 
M2  PC  0.0472  1.1412  0.4648  1.0315  0.4843  0.8597 
GE  PC  H  0.3373  0.6452  0.7065  0.6828  0.6488  0.7574 
PC  MI  3.6700'  2.0091'  2.2902  1.1840  0.8899  0.4544 
PC  M2  2.0487  0.9324  3.63  16'  1.4334  2.0873*  1.0248 
H  PC  1.3580  1.5144  0.7117  0.6157  0.1522  0.3870 
MI  PC  0.1615  0.5855  0.2980  0.2447  0.3265  0.1900 
M2  PC  0.0639  0.5631  0.1868  0.6004  0.2075  0.7861 Table 4.2 (continued) 
F Statistics for Lags (m,  n) and Period Ending:$ 
1971111  1973IV  1976IV 
Variable' 
m=6  m=8  m=6  m=8  m=6  m=8 
Country  Y  X  n=3  n=8  n=3  n=8  n=3  n=8 















































































































































































































































'All variables are first differences of the natural log; PC is the consumer price index, H is high-powered money, M1 is currency plus demand deposits, and 
M2  is currency plus the sum of  demand and time deposits. 
'All  regressions start 195811. The null hypothesis is that the 7,  are as a group equal to zero 
+Reject null hypothesis at a = 0.10. 
'Reject  null hypothesis at ct  = 0.05. 
**Reject  null hypothesis at a = 0.01. 74  Chapter Four 
do these reverse influences  show any  consistency  with  regard  to the 
monetary aggregate employed.  lo These results therefore suggest that the 
rate of  inflation is not necessarily exogenous in monetary models regard- 
less of  the degree to which prices are equalized via arbitrage.’’ 
One problem with the results is that in several of  the countries the 
relations differ markedly depending upon which price variable is used. 
Britain is the prime example. Using the GDP deflator, we find no in- 
fluence from  lagged  high-powered  money  to prices in  Britain  and a 
significant influence, in two of  the three periods, running the other way. 
Using the retail price index, we  find almost exactly the opposite. A 
similar inconsistency exists using M1  and M2.’*  In the  regressions with the 
GDP  deflator, both monetary aggregates have a significant influence on 
prices with little relation the other way; in the regressions with the retail 
price index, prices more often influence money. For the other countries, 
the results are more consistent between price-level measures. 
The data therefore establish a pattern that on the whole is consistent 
with monetary explanations of the inflation process. They fail, however, 
to corroborate the popular interpretation of  the MABP, in which prices 
adjust instantaneously but money supply adjusts only with a lag. Either 
domestic monetary forces by themselves or  international forces operating 
via  some combination of  a reserve-flow mechanism and central bank 
reaction function (or some combination of the two) were important. 
4.4.2  Price and Interest-Rate Arbitrage 
In table 4.3  we report test results derived from two sets of international 
price relations. In one we compare movements in the domestic price 
levels in each of  the eight countries with movements in an index of price 
levels in the remaining seven countries. In the other we compare move- 
ments in the price level in each of  the seven non-reserve-currency coun- 
tries with movements in the price level in the U.S.  Both sets of results are 
for the period  through  1971111,  since  after  that time most  countries 
experienced substantial changes  in  their  dollar exchange  rate. In  all 
instances we included six lagged values of  the dependent variable in the 
equation and three of  the independent variable. 
For the comparisons of domestic and rest-of-world inflation, the results 
are mixed. We find some influence from lagged rest-of-world to domestic 
prices for the period ending 1971111 in two countries, France and Japan. 
When we included the contemporaneous value of the world price index in 
10. British results from much longer-term time series consistent with these findings are 
reported in Huffman and Lothian (1980) and for the postwar period in Williams, Goodhart, 
and Gowland (1976). 
11. This same result was obtained for a broad range of  Latin American countries in 
Cassese (1979, chapter 6). 
12. In theU.K.  whatwecallM2iswhat theBankofEnglandcallssterlingM3, butunlike 
their series it excludes government deposits and certificates of  deposit. 75  Inflation and the Timing of  Monetary and Price Changes 
Table 4.3  Price Arbitrage 
rn  n 
Yr=ao+ P  p,y,-,+  z y,x,+, 
r=l  ,=I 
Variablet  F Statistics  Variable  F Statistic 
m=6  m=6 
Country  Y  X  n=3  Y  X  n=3 
CA  PD  PDw  1.6741  PD  PDus  1.6765 
PDw  PD  3.4386*  PDus  PD  0.5394 
FR  PD  PDw  3.0056#  PD  PDus  0.9744 
PDw  PD  3.9842*#  PDus  PD  0.4912 
GE  PD  PDw  0.2701  PD  PDus  3.9752" 
PDw  PD  0.8389  PDus  PD  1.1123 
IT  PD  PDw  1.1179  PD  PDus  0.3129 
PDw  PD  1.3534  PDus  PD  1.1805 
JA  PD  PDw  2.3618'  PD  PDus  0.6907 
PDw  PD  0.6436  PDus  PD  1.4863 
NE  PD  PDw  1.2523  PD  PDus  1.3365 
PDw  PD  0.9483  PDus  PD  0.3511 
UK  PD  PDw  0.3151  PD  PDus  2.0759' 
PDw  PD  0.3744  PDus  PD  0.4319 
us  PD  PDw  1.4831 
PDw  PD  2.4181' 
'All variables are first differences of the natural log. PD is the GNP or GDPdeflator, PDw is 
the rest-of-world deflator, and PDus is the GNP deflator for the United States. 
'All  regressions 195811 to 1971111. The null hypothesis is that the yj as a group are equal to 
zero. 
'Reject  null hypothesis at (Y  = 0.10. 
#Reject null hypothesis at (Y  = 0.05. 
##Reject null hypothesis at (Y  = 0.01. 
the equations, there was a significant relation for Canada also. For the 
U.S.,  the relation ran in the opposite direction. Somewhat anomalously, 
we uncovered a statistically significant reverse influence for Canada and 
France. 
The U.S.  versus individual foreign country price comparisons showed 
significant effects of lagged U.S.  prices on German and British prices only 
and a borderline  relation for Canada, which again became significant 
when we included the contemporaneous  value of  U.S. prices. France and 
Japan, the countries that exhibited the strongest response to rest-of- 
world prices, showed no relation with the U.S. 
We summarize the U.S. versus foreign interest rate relations in table 
4.4. With the exception of  Italy for which we could obtain only a long- 
term rate, these comparisons are for three-month U.S.  Treasury bills and 
a similar short-term foreign rate. Of all of the arbitrage relations, these 76  Chapter Four 
Table 4.4  Interest Arbitrage 
rn 
Yt=a,,+  P,r,-,+  x Y,X-, 
,-I  ,=I 
Variable'  F  Statistics 
m=6 
Country  Y  X  m=3 
CA  IS 
ISUS 
FR  IS 
ISUS 
GE  IS 
ISUS 
IT  IL 
ILUS 
JA  IS 
ISUS 
NE  IS 
ISUS 






























'The  interest rates are in first difference form. IS is the short-term interest rate for each 
country except Italy, for which the long-term interest rate is used. ISus is the short-term 
interest rate for the United States. 
4All regressions 195811 to 1971111. The null hypothesis is that they, as a group are equal to 
zero. 
*Reject null hypothesis at Q = 0.10. 
"Reject  null hypothesis at Q = 0.05. 
"Reject  null hypothesis at a  = 0.01. 
show the most consistency among countries. For all the foreign countries 
other than Japan, lagged U.S.  interest rates have a significant effect. And 
in most instances-Canada  especially-both  the magnitude and signifi- 
cance of the effect increase when we include the contemporaneous  value 
of  the U.S.  rate along with the lagged. For Germany, however, we also 
uncovered a reverse influence. For Japan, our failure to find any relation 
may be largely the result of  the nature of the Japanese capital market over 
much of  this period, the fact that the Japanese government exercised 
substantial direct control over interest rates. 
4.4.3  Central Bank Behavior and the Balance of  Payments 
In table 4.5 we report the resuIts of the Granger tests of the relations 
between changes in foreign reserves and in domestic assets of the mone- 
tary authorities of the seven foreign countries.13  For the U.S.,  since it is 
13. Blejer  (1979) presents  results  of  similar  tests  for  four  of  the  countries  in  our 
sample-France,  Germany, Italy,  and the  U.K.-and  for  Sweden. He, however, finds 
considerably less evidence of  sterilization. 77  Inflation and the Timing of  Monetary and Price Changes 
Table 4.5  Domestic Credit and the Balance of  Payments 
m 
Y,=ao+ z P,K,+ c Y,X,-, 
r=l  i= I 
F Statistics for 
Lags (tn,  n)  and Period Ending:$ 
Variable'  1971111  1973IV  1976IV 
m=3  m=3  m=3 























































































2.6524  * 
1.0156 
'The  variables for Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan are first differences of  the natural 
log. The variables for France, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S.  are arithmetic first 
differences scaled by high-powered money. FH is official reserve assets, DH is domestic 
credit, BP is the U.S. official settlements balance, and H is high-powered money. 
$All  regressions start in 195811. The  null hypothesis is that the 7,  are as a group equal to zero. 
*Reject null hypothesis at a  = 0.10. 
*Reject  null hypothesis at a  = 0.05. 
"Reject  null hypothesis at a  = 0.01 
the reserve-currency country, we report results based on the relation 
between the balance of  payments, on an official settlements basis and 
scaled  by  high-powered  money,  and changes  in  total  high-powered 
money. 
By far, the more consistent relation for the foreign countries is from 
changes in foreign reserves to changes in domestic credit. France, Ger- 
many, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.K., and, to a lesser extent, Italy all 
show a significant and negative effect of  foreign reserves on domestic 
assets.  In Canada, the sums of  the coefficients  are positive  but  not 
statistically significant at the lag lengths reported in the table. However, 
when we extended the lag to six periods for the independent  variable, the 
coefficients became significant and their sum remained positive. 78  Chapter Four 
The relations running in the other direction, somewhat surprisingly, 
are less well defined. Among the foreign countries, Japan is the only 
country for which there is a significant and negative influence of domestic 
on  foreign assets. In the Netherlands, the relation is significantly different 
from zero in two instances but the sum of  the coefficients is positive. 
In the U.S., in two of the periods we find a significant relation running 
from high-powered  money  to the official settlements balance and no 
effect in the opposite direction. 
In all of the foreign countries, therefore, some type of  central bank 
reaction function seems to have existed over the sample period. The 
monetary authorities, in countries other than Canada, apparently tried to 
offset the effects of balance-of-payments movements on their domestic 
money stocks. The Bank of  Canada, in contrast, seems to have done the 
opposite. Desirous perhaps of  maintaining a stable exchange rate with 
the U.S. dollar, the Canadians appear to have reacted to balance-of- 
payments inflows by engaging in some monetary expansion of their own. 
The Federal Reserve's actions-and  the results are hardly at variance 
with what one could expect for the central bank of  a reserve-currency 
country-appears  to have paid little attention to the balance of payments 
in  conducting policy.  That policy,  however,  seems to have  been  the 
source of the sometimes sizable U.S. balance-of-payments deficits during 
this period. 
4.4.4  Sources of  Monetary Change 
We ran two other series of  regressions and performed the associated 
Granger tests to analyze the sources of  monetary growth in the seven 
foreign countries in the sample from two slightly different perspectives." 
In one, we compared movements in the three domestic monetary aggre- 
gates in each of the countries with the movements of their counterparts  in 
the U.S. In  the other, we  compared the movements  in  each of  the 
domestic aggregates with movements in foreign and domestic assets of 
that country's monetary authorities. For the sake of brevity, we do not 
report these results. 
The first set of  results was not terribly satisfactory. Only in the Cana- 
dian and German regressions were there significant positive relations 
between the lagged U.S. aggregate and the comparable domestic aggre- 
gate. In both countries,  moreover, there were somewhat implausible 
significant reverse influences in several instances. 
The foreign asset and domestic asset versus domestic monetary aggre- 
gate tests were slightly better. For all the non-reserve-currency countries 
except the U.K., movements in lagged foreign assets made a statistically 
14. The results that we discuss in this section are for the period ending 1971111 only. 
Results for  the  longer period  during which  exchange  rates were more variable  were 
considerably less satisfactory. 79  Inflation and the Timing of Monetary and Price Changes 
significant contribution to the explanation of movements in at least one of 
the monetary aggregates. The results for domestic assets were a mixed 
lot. For three of the countries-Canada,  Italy, and the U.K.-domestic 
assets had no perceptible influence on any of the three monetary aggre- 
gates. For the others-France,  Germany, Japan, and the Netherland- 
domestic assets had a statistically significant, but negative, effect. 
These latter results are difficult to rationalize as reflections of  central 
bank behavior. They could arise because of  either spurious correlation 
or the existence of  a more intricate relation between foreign assets of 
the  central  banks  of  the  reserve-currency  and  non-reserve-currency 
countries. 
4.5  Summary and Conclusions 
Our purpose  in  this  chapter has  been  to investigate the channels 
through which inflation has been transmitted internationally. To do so we 
have focused upon five areas that featured prominently in our theoretical 
discussion: the relation  between  domestic money and prices, the in- 
fluence of  foreign prices on domestic prices, the influence of  foreign 
interest rates on domestic interest rates, the behavior of the central bank, 
and the relation between the components of  high-powered money and 
the monetary aggregates. 
The results we have obtained have several major implications. Let us 
consider the money-price relation first. In all countries our tests showed a 
significant effect of lagged domestic money growth on domestic inflation, 
which appears to be fairly robust across the specifications  we tried. The 
strength of  these relations suggests that one-shot and transitory phe- 
nomena, such as shifts in money demand, are unlikely to have been the 
major causative factors behind inflation. Similarly, given the absence of a 
consistent  reverse  relation  from  inflation to money growth for most 
countries, an explanation of inflation that attributes it primarily to cost- 
push accommodated by domestic monetary growth appears doubtful for 
most, if  not all, of  the countries in the sample. 
What at first glance appears surprising about these results is the similar- 
ity in the timing relations among countries. According to one somewhat 
popular notion, they ought to differ: changes in monetary growth occur- 
ring before changes in inflation in the United States, the reserve-currency 
country, and occurring afterward in the seven foreign countries. As we 
have pointed out, however, there is no necessary correspondence be- 
tween openness and the direction of  Granger-causation. 
Our results  are consistent with the seven foreign economies being 
independent of  the U.S. or, alternatively, with a chain of transmission 
running from U.S. money via the balance of payments to foreign money 
and thence to foreign prices. They are inconsistent with an adjustment 
mechanism that operates exclusively via price arbitrage. 80  Chapter Four 
Further evidence on the question of price arbitrage comes from the two 
sets of  price comparisons we have made. They provide no evidence of  a 
strong price  arbitrage  relation  and thus do not  suggest that domestic 
money was purely passive or that foreign central banks were purely silent 
partners of the U.S. monetary authorities. They imply that some poten- 
tial existed for a number of the non-reserve-currency countries to operate 
an independent monetary policy, at least in the short run. 
To the extent that there was an international transmission process, it 
appears to have worked  through  asset  markets. In all countries  but 
Japan, some evidence of interest arbitrage was uncovered. Additionally, 
in all but the U.K., changes in foreign reserves had a statistically signifi- 
cant effect  on  at  least  one of  the  three  monetary  aggregates.  Fur- 
thermore, in Canada and Germany-the  countries that both had very 
similar inflation experiences to that of  the U.S. in the period prior to 
1972-U.S.  monetary variables had a significant effect on the domestic 
monetary variables. Thus, when we combine the inflation comparison 
results with the interest arbitrage and the foreign reserve-domestic  credit 
results, we obtain a picture of  the operation of a self-regulating mecha- 
nism  preventing  long-run monetary independence  but  allowing  some 
scope for short-term domestic monetary control. 
Another set of  implications stems from what we have learned from 
analyses of changes in the asset components of  the central banks' port- 
folios and of  their relations with changes in high-powered money and the 
two  broader  monetary  aggregates.  These  are,  however,  somewhat 
tenuous.  In  a  number  of  countries-France,  Germany,  Japan,  the 
Netherlands, and to some extent Italy and the U.K.-we  find evidence of 
some sterilization of reserve inflows. For Canada, we found a significant 
positive effect of  reserve inflows on domestic assets. 
On the whole,  these are a priori  appealing results  that appear to 
explain some of  the differences among countries: low- and moderate- 
inflation countries trying to avoid importing inflation from the U.S. and 
being at least partially successful; Canada seeking to stabilize its price 
level  and exchange rate vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar; and Italy  and  the 
U.  K.-the  higher-inflation countries-acquiescing  in the face of reserve 
inflows and perhaps, though the data are mostly moot on this point, going 
the U.S. one step better in the way of  monetary expansion.'s 
15. The general thrust of  these conclusions is similar to that of  Connolly and Taylor 
(1979). Tullio (1979) contains a model of the U.S.  balance of payments that is also consistent 
with our results.  His finding of  an initial overshooting in the U.S. balance of  payments 
following an increase in U.S.  domestic credit is suggestive of a chain of  causation similar to 
the one we have outlined: from U.S.  monetary policy via the balance of payments to foreign 
money and then to foreign prices. 81  Inflation and the Timing of  Monetary and Price Changes 
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